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Overview 
•  Brief History Lesson in Spacecraft Operations: 
•  Where we’ve been (Apollo) 
•  Where we are (Shuttle) 
•  Where we were headed (Constellation) 
•  Where we’re going now 
•  Operations Requirements for Deep Space Missions 
•  Roadmap 
•  How do we get there 
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Spacecraft Operations during 
Dynamic Phases of Flight 
Inner-loop Flight 
Control 
Trajectory 
Management 
Mission Decision 
Making 
Systems Health 
Management 
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Apollo 12 Ascent Operations: Systems 
Management 
  36.5 seconds after lift-off from Kennedy Space 
Center, the vehicle triggered a lightning discharge 
through itself.  
  Protective circuits on the fuel cells in the service 
module falsely detected overloads and took all 
three fuel cells offline 
  Power supply problems lit nearly every warning 
light on the control panel and caused much of the 
instrumentation to malfunction. 
  The telemetry stream at Mission Control was 
garbled nonsense.  
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Apollo 12 Ascent Operations: Systems 
Management 
  Pete Conrad:  
“Although I was watching the gauges I was aware of a white light. 
The next thing I noted was that I heard the master alarm 
ringing in my ears and I glanced over to the caution and 
warning panel and it was a sight to behold.” 
   Almost every warning light that had anything to 
do with the electrical system was on. 
  The telemetry stream at Mission Control was 
garbled nonsense.  
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Apollo 12 Ascent Operations: Systems 
Management 
 EECOM John Aaron remembered the 
telemetry failure pattern from an earlier 
test 
 Aaron made a call:  
"Try SCE to aux". 
 This switched the SCE to a backup power 
supply 
 Aaron's quick thinking prevented an abort 
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Apollo 11 LEM Descent and Landing 
Operations: Systems Management 
  102:38:26 Armstrong: (With the slightest touch of urgency) 
Program Alarm. 
  102:38:30 Armstrong: (To Houston) It's a 1202. 
  102:38:32 Aldrin: 1202. (Pause)  
  102:38:42 Armstrong (on-board): (To Buzz) What is it?  
  (To Houston) “Give us a reading on the 1202 
Program Alarm” 
  102:38:53 Duke: “Roger. We got you”...(With 
some urgency in his voice)  
“We're Go On That Alarm.” 
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Lessons Learned from Apollo 11 
Operations: Workload 
“The most difficult part [of the entire mission] from 
my perspective, and the one that gave me the most 
pause, was the final descent to landing”   
“far and away the most complex part of the flight”  
“systems were very heavily loaded at that time”   
“the unknowns were rampant”   
“there were just a thousand things to worry about… It was hardest for 
the system and it was hardest for the crews to complete that part of 
the flight successfully” 
- Neil Armstrong, September 2001 
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Launch Operations: 300? People Mission Control Operations:  300? People 
•  On-orbit Activities Managed by 
Ground Control 
•  CapCom in the loop on every 
decision 
•  On-board mission re-planning 
Limited to None  
•  Voice-loops to Earth critical 
•  Life-support, Spacecraft Health, 
Navigation managed from Mission 
Control 
•  Launch, Mission Control, and 
Science Team are “Standing Teams”, 
this is their sole job. 
•  Ground Operations Collocated by 
Areas in one  spot 
In transit Ops Scripted 
and Managed from 
Earth 
Earth Orbit Ops are 
Scripted and Managed 
from Earth 
•  Ground made the call on the 1202 alert 
•  Ground made the call on how to recover from 
the ascent lightning strike on Apollo 12 
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Shuttle Fault Management Interfaces 
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Lessons Learned from Apollo 11 
Operations 
•  Project Constellation 
Vehicles 
•  Severe weight limitations 
•  very limited onboard 
computing capability 
•  severe funding starvation 
•  focus quickly devolved to 
shuttle replacement (station 
servicing) ops 
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12 
The Big-Picture Scenario 
Today we are launching a bold and ambitious new space initiative to 
enable us to explore new worlds, develop more innovative 
technologies, foster new industries, increase our understanding of the 
Earth, expand our presence in the solar system, and inspire the next-
generation of explorers… 
…the President has laid out a dynamic plan for NASA to invest in 
critical and transformative technologies.  These will enable our path 
beyond low Earth orbit through development of new launch and space 
transportation technologies, nimble construction capabilities on orbit, 
and new operations capabilities.  Imagine… people fanning out across 
the inner solar system, exploring the Moon, asteroids and Mars nearly 
simultaneously in a steady stream of “firsts;”…  
-  Dr. Charles Bolden, NASA Administrator, NASA Budget Press Conference, February 1, 
2010 
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Speed-of-Light Communications 
Delays beyond LEO 
2.4 sec 20-40 sec 2-20 min 
Missions 
Lunar 
NEO 
Mars 
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Launch Operations: 30 People 
•  Life-support, Spacecraft Health, Navigation     
  managed locally with support from Mission 
Control 
•  Destination Activities Managed by Crew 
•  CapCom is informed of decisions after the fact 
•  On-board planning and anomaly recovery 
•  Strategic Activities Managed by Ground 
Control 
•  Mission Control is a “Small Team” with  
   on-call experts.  More like “Mission Support 
Line” 
•  Constant voice-loops to Earth non-critical 
•  Ground Operations called upon by the Crew on 
“as-needed” basis 
In-Space Ops 
Managed by Crew and 
On-board systems 
Science Operations:  3000+ Distributed People 
Ground Control Ops:  3? People, 300 on-call 
Robotic 
Ops are 
Dynamic 
and 
Managed 
by Crew 
Proximity Ops are 
Dynamically 
determined from 
basic plans by 
Crew and On-
board systems 
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Operations Concepts for Deep-Space Missions 
   Distributed crew-ground mission management 
o   Brings broad new requirements to  
−  Migrate key capabilities onboard to reduce dependency on the 
ground for tactical off-nominal situation response and mission 
replanning 
−  Enhance onboard capability to process and integrate mission-
relevant information  
−  Enhanced onboard capability to make time-critical decisions  
−  Enhanced onboard capability to plan and replan destination-based 
mission activity schedules with delayed ground involvement. 
−  Develop New Crew-Ground collaboration concepts over all mission 
phases  
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Operations Concepts for Deep-Space Missions 
Critical Enabling Technologies 
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Software Development 
•  Enhanced vehicle/habitat mission operation automation: 
•  In-flight trajectory planning and re-planning 
•  Anomaly detection, fault  isolation, and fault recovery 
•  Embedded VR environments for JIT training 
•  Procedure generation and execution 
•  Multi-crew activity scheduling and rescheduling tools 
•  Information organization and presentation to support task-oriented displays 
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Intelligent Integrated Knowledge Engineering Architectures 
JSC Concept for SLI (2002) MSFC Concept (2005) 
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• Requirement: Replace today’s “standing army” of ground-based subject 
matter experts with three or four crewmembers and delayed ground 
support 
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Enhanced Crew Operational Capabilities
• “ISOL A
 Procee
d” 
  Existing crew-vehicle 
interfaces almost 
exclusively visual-manual 
  Other human information 
processing channels 
(auditory-vocal, haptics) 
are underutilized 
•  Integrated Natural-
Language based and 
manual crew-vehicle 
communication and 
commanding interfaces 
•   Real-time analysis of 
crew information 
acquisition and 
commanding activities 
•   Activity-based 
information display  
•   Adjustable human-
machine function 
allocation based on 
behavior-based 
assessments of 
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Enhanced Crew Operational Capabilities 
•  Information presentation and display schemes to filter and provide crew with critical 
mission management information 
•  avoid crew overload 
•  Flexible, adjustable crew-machine function allocation (adjustable automation) 
schemes 
•  Real-time analysis of crew information acquisition and commanding 
activities 
•  Adjustable human-machine function allocation based on  
•  behavior-based assessments of performance readiness 
•  system knowledge of crew roles and procedures 
•  Support tools for distributed mixed crew/automation teaming 
•  Surface ops: Crew-robotic teaming 
•  Habitat and Vehicle ops: Crew-immobotic teaming 
•  Rapid, quantitative 
development and usability 
testing of candidate IISM 
architectures , crew-IISM user 
interfaces and crew-
automation interactions 
•  Development of real-time 
human performance analysis  
and augmented cognition tools 
•  Development of Crew-
centered machine-based 
agents for Distributed 
Collaborative Interactions 
•  Evaluation of Crew-
System performance under 
accurate environmental 
stressors 
•  Ops Concept Evaluations in 
Full-Mission Simulation w/6DF 
Motion 
•  Test, Evaluate, and Mature 
Distributed Asynchronous 
Crew-Ground Collaborative 
concepts with light-speed 
delays 
ISE 
IISM 
S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S 1 
Ops Concept Development Roadmap 
•  Ops concept 
evaluations for mixed 
(crew-robotic) multi-
agent surface operations 
and surface habitat 
management 
Crew-IISM Interfaces 
Mission Control Center 
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Perform Mission Operations 
Element Trades 
Decision and Analysis Categories 
X 
Detailed Operations Phases 
On-board human 
decision feasible? 
On-board  
decision support 
Automation 
required 
On-board 
automation 
feasible? 
Timely communication 
with Earth feasible? 
On-board 
automation 
Earth-based support 
provided 
Mission  or vehicle 
redesign required 
Earth-based decision 
support 
Earth-based 
automation 
Timely Earth-based human 
decision feasible? 
Yes No 
No Yes 
No Yes 
No Yes 
High Priority 
Medium Priority 
Low Priority 
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Complete Operations Trade-space Analyses 
Earth-based On-board 
Decision 
Support 
Complex 
strategic 
decisions 
Human-driven 
short cycle-time 
decisions 
Automation 
Long-term 
analysis, off-line 
predictions 
Safety-critical 
well-defined 
computational 
tasks  
1 2 
3 4 
Locus of authority  
 (a continuum of how 
the decision are made) 
Locus of control  
 (a continuum of “who’s in charge”) 
Assumes a “Minimize Risk” posture 
High Priority Medium Priority 
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Complete Operations Trade-space Analyses 
•  Develop and evaluate Ops concepts with varying: 
•  Failure propagation latency and criticality 
•  Communication latencies between crew and ground, crew/
crew, and crew-robotic agents 
•  Identify human-interface issues early in the design 
cycle  
•  Develop Agent-based architectures for distributed collaborative 
activities across all flight phases 
•  Standardize crew-machine interfaces for vehicle and surface 
habitat/EVA operations 
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Integrated Model-based Development Uses 
•  Develop, test, and evaluate intuitive, flexible data-
mining and information-querying methodologies 
•  Natural Language understanding in noisy 
environments 
•  Information Display and Information Filtering 
•  Advanced Caution and Warning systems 
•  Distributed, collaborative operations concepts 
with asynchronous communications between 
agents 
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PFD 
Main Check-list 
Mssg 
Four ROI 
Fixation Clusters and region of interest (ROI) determination 
Fault_Log_P1_M_L18 Fault_Log_P1_M_L17 
Fault_Log_P1_M_L16 Fault_Log_P1_M_L15 
Fault_Log_P1_M_L14 Fault_Log_P1_M_L13 
Fault_Log_P1_M_L12 Fault_Log_P1_M_L11 
Fault_Log_P1_M_L10 Fault_Log_P1_M_L09 
Fault_Log_P1_M_L07 Fault_Log_P1_M_L06 
Fault_Log_P1_M_L05 Fault_Log_P1_M_L04 
Fault_Log_P1_M_L02 
S17 FAST 
S16 SLOW 
Model 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
Order 
Root Cause 
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Complete Operations Trade-space Analyses 
•  Model V&V via truth-testing against telemetry derived 
from ground-based hardware-in-the-loop tests and flight 
tests 
•  Real-Time Mission Support Tool 
–  Run ISE in real-time once mission commences 
–  Perform continuous comparisons between model-
generated telemetry values and actual telemetry values 
–  Provide enhanced capabilities to carry out very high-
fidelity, faster-than real time ground-based testing and 
simulation to support off-nominal mission 
troubleshooting a la Apollo 13 
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Launch Operations: 30 People 
Distributed Crew-Ground Operations Model 
•  Life-support, Spacecraft Health, Navigation     
  managed locally with support from Mission 
Control 
•  Destination Activities Managed by Crew 
•  CapCom is informed of decisions after the fact 
•  On-board planning and anomaly recovery 
•  Strategic Activities Managed by Ground 
Control 
•  Mission Control is a “Small Team” with  
   on-call experts.  More like “Mission Support 
Line” 
•  Constant voice-loops to Earth non-critical 
•  Ground Operations called upon by the Crew on 
“as-needed” basis 
In-Space Ops 
Managed by Crew and 
On-board systems 
Science Operations:  3000+ Distributed People 
Ground Control Ops:  3? People, 300 on-call 
Robotic 
Ops are 
Dynamic 
and 
Managed 
by Crew 
Proximity Ops are 
Dynamically 
determined from 
basic plans by 
Crew and On-
board systems 
